Much of the promise of these models relies on learned concepts being high quality .

Mixup refers to interpolation-based data augmentation, originally motivated as a way to go beyond empirical risk minimization (ERM). Its extensions mostly focus on the definition of interpolation and the space (input or embedding) where it takes place, while the augmentation process itself is less studied. In most methods, the number of generated examples is limited to the mini-batch size and the number of examples being interpolated is limited to two (pairs), in the input space. We make progress in this direction by introducing MultiMix, which generates an arbitrarily large number of interpolated examples beyond the mini-batch size, and interpolates the entire mini-batch in the embedding space.

Optimal auction design is a fundamental problem in algorithmic game theory.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design . Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions the agent takes in response to different signals, assuming that the agent maximizes their own expected utility. Our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.